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Executive Summary
The Cross-Industry Working Team (XIWT), with the support of Stanford University Consortium for Research on Information Security and Policy (CRISP), sponsored a symposium on cross-industry activities aimed at improving the reliability, dependability, and robustness of the information infrastructure. The purpose of this meeting was to identify the steps required to get to a reliable and dependable information infrastructure serving the needs of society. The emphasis in the meeting was on cross-industry and potentially cross-sector (government, industry, and academia) activities to accomplish that goal. The symposium dealt with the following generic topics: organizational activities to identify and pursue critical issues, issues in data transport and communications, issues in applications and services, and potential research and development activities.
The presentations and discussions of the meeting identified several potential cross-industry activities that could further the effort toward a more reliable and trustworthy information infrastructure. These activities fell into four general categories:
• Information Exchange Activities • Consensus Activities • Collaborative Operational Activities • Collaborative R&D Activities
Two specific activities were discussed in some detail.
Government Sharing of Best Practices
It was observed that many of the government agencies have undertaken extensive efforts to improve the trustworthiness of their information systems, enabling them to withstand both failures and attacks. There is an opportunity for these agencies to be exemplars for the community-sharing what they have learned in the process of trying to make their systems more robust. This was felt to be an example of how the government and industry could work together to improve the trustworthiness of the overall information infrastructure.
Introduction and Overview
A dependable, robust information infrastructure-the set of technologies, services, and information-processing machines that work together, end to end, to perform communications and information-processing tasks when they are needed-today underpins a well-functioning society. Moreover, such an infrastructure is a strategic necessity for a competitive economy. The present rate of growth only hints at the ultimate size and value of the information infrastructure, but it will be unsustainable without better dependability and robustness. The emerging network-, computer-, and software-intensive information-technology infrastructure is efficient at meeting diverse communications requirements, but is complex and difficult to understand and manage with respect to dependability and robustness.
Assuring the dependability of the joint global information infrastructure in the presence of diverse threats will require concerted and cooperative action of multiple forms covering both technical and policy domains. The technical, economic, and policy issues are multivariate across business boundaries and markets; thus there is real gain to common understanding and action. A mix of information exchange and cooperative research and development activities is required to deal with emerging issues and progress toward a satisfactorily robust and dependable infrastructure. Implementing solutions across the infrastructure will require cooperation and agreement of broad segments of the development, operations, and user communities. Without a more solid foundation of common understanding and commitment it is unlikely that we will sustain the present growth of the "infrastructure-enabled economy" based on advances of the information-enabled infrastructure.
To that end, the Cross-Industry Working Team (XIWT), with the cooperation and support of the Stanford University Consortium for Research on Information Security and Policy (CRISP), sponsored a symposium on cross-industry, cross-sector activities aimed at improving the reliability, dependability, and robustness of the information infrastructure. The symposium was held 3-4 November 1998 in Crystal City, VA, and was attended by in excess of one hundred people.
The purpose of this meeting was to identify the steps required to get to a reliable and dependable information infrastructure serving the needs of society. Attended by representatives of a broad spectrum of industries as well as government and academia, the emphasis in
Information Exchange Activities
There was widespread agreement in the symposium that exchange of information of a variety of types across the various industrial sectors as well as between government, industry, and academia would be helpful as we try to achieve a more reliable and robust information infrastructure. Several potential activities were identified:
Sharing of Best Practices
Developing mechanisms to share "best practices" in the development and operations of various aspects of the information infrastructure was of interest. One area of interest was the sharing of best practices for security posture, perhaps working with the "Big 4" accounting firms.
An idea that was proposed and looked promising was to have the government share its experiences in building information infrastructure, thereby providing exemplars of methods for achieving robust information infrastructures as well as a forum for discussing some of the problems. The rationale is that, while industry participants may have proprietary concerns in sharing what they do to achieve a reliable system, government agencies may be able to share such information with a selected audience more freely. This would provide concrete examples of systems for discussion in the community. A specific suggestion was made that the XIWT might organize such a meeting where the chief information officers of government agencies would be invited to present to a cross-industry meeting their approaches to achieving a trustworthy information system.
Other Information Exchange Suggestions
Several other potential information exchange activities were suggested. It was noted that the reporting and sharing of incident reports, bug reports, etc., would help developers and operators. Similarly, an "Indications and Warning Center," tracking aberrant activities in the information infrastructure and providing early warning to system operators, would be helpful. There is already activity in this area, through the NCC (a subset of the National Communication System), but linking to industry initiatives and broadening the activity to go beyond communications would have significant payoff.
Educating the public concerning issues of trustworthy information infrastructure was felt to be of considerable value. In particular, the group felt that there was considerable need to educate new and emerging engineering and computer science graduates regarding both the theory and practice of how to develop, deploy, and operate a reliable distributed information infrastructure system.
On a more mundane note, but one of considerable perceived value, is a cross-sector database (both "white" and "yellow" pages) of contact information for the critical people to contact in the event of a problem in one or more of the subsystems. Such a database would simplify the job of identifying problems and developing real-time solutions.
Consensus Activities
A number of areas were identified where developing a consensus across a broad spectrum of the relevant community could help further the effort toward a trustworthy information system.
The relationship of best practices, service level agreements, and insurability was noted. Developing a common language and set of metrics that could provide a basis for service level agreements and insurability has a high potential for helping move the community forward. It would provide a basis for defining accepted and acceptable practices, along with expectations for the system, and therefore provide a basis for defining liability.
Moving the community forward in a collective manner would be facilitated through agreement on a "survivability architecture." Much as the Internet protocol suite and architecture allowed the community to work together to develop new and extended functions, agreement on a survivability architecture would support discussion on functional decomposition and allocation of the needed functions for a trustworthy system.
Providing a vehicle for cross-industry input to the government was felt to be quite useful, particularly if such a vehicle could integrate positions across the various relevant industrial sectors (telecommunications, networking, distributed information systems, etc.). Input would be valuable to both the government policy development process and the R&D planning process.
Similarly, there is a need for a vehicle for cross-sector interaction with the various standards bodies and other cross-industry activities. There are simply too many organizations for a single company to participate in, and yet the trustworthiness of the overall information infrastructure relies on successful interaction between all of these efforts.
The information infrastructure, by its very nature, supports multiple application domains. Development of domain-specific requirements would allow consumers to state what they want and judge whether they are getting what they need. It was felt that a good way to start this process would be to use the other critical infrastructures mentioned in the PCCIP report as application domains for the information infrastructure.
Collaborative Operational Activities
The information infrastructure is a complex aggregation of technologies and services, ranging from underlying telecommunications, networks, and distributed computing platforms to middleware supporting distributed applications. Cross-industry collaborative operational activities are meant to assure the smooth and reliable operation of the overall infrastructure. Several such potential activities were identified:
• Motivated by issues similar to those for the metrics for service level agreements and insurability mentioned above, a coordinated program of data collection aimed at supporting actuarial risk management was suggested. Such an activity would assist in the development of insurability and liability assessment as well as informing the cost trade-offs implied by the need for development and integration of trustworthiness mechanisms.
• Future research into trustworthiness techniques for the integrated information infrastructure needs to be motivated by past and anticipated experience in operating such systems.
To that end, a database capturing such experience, and focusing on incidents whether accidental or intentional, would be useful in supporting such research.
• Recognizing that the performance of the overall information infrastructure and its consequent trustworthiness depends on the integrated whole, not just the pieces, implies the need for distributed performance monitoring to assure such continued reliable overall performance. The current Internet Performance Working Group (IPerf) of XIWT was given as an example of such an activity.
Collaborative R&D Activities
Moving the community forward toward a more trustworthy information infrastructure will require considerable research and development. Furthermore, the nature of the problem (highly distributed over a wide variety of organizations and industrial sectors) implies the need for collaborative research to assure widespread adoption and deployment of those results requiring adoption.
Collaborative Experimental Environments
The group identified a number of worthwhile collaborative R&D activities. Discussed fairly extensively was the notion of an experimental distributed collaborative environment to evaluate and validate new approaches. The concept is for a number of industrial organizations, the operators and developers of the information infrastructure, to collaborate through an experimental environment in evaluating and validating potential solutions to the problems of trustworthiness. This would allow more effective assimilation of results from the research community (notably universities) as well as providing a mechanism to provide feedback and guidance to those researchers. A major focus of such work could be on understanding and validating techniques for building reliable systems of unreliable components and techniques for dealing with large complex systems. Existing and planned government test beds could be exemplars of such collaboration, and should be interfaced to industrial collaborative activities to take maximal advantage of such experimental activities.
Other R&D Activities
Red teaming is a useful area of collaborative R&D, creating an environment and mechanisms so that potential failures in the integrated infrastructure can be identified and addressed early in the deployment cycle. Similar to the domain-specific requirements development activity mentioned above, domain-oriented R&D activity could be worthwhile. In particular, the concept is to develop and demonstrate techniques that would provide trustworthy information systems satisfying the requirements of specific application domains.
Finally, it was noted that historically, the community has been motivated to make a concerted effort to address failures in systems once a clear failure had occurred with significant effect. We should look for potential test cases that will stress the robustness and reliability of the information infrastructure, and at a minimum comprehensively monitor those effects. Two such "electronic Pearl Harbors" are upcoming. The Y2K problem has the characteristic that we know when it is likely to occur, although we do not know what the effects will be. Hence, it would be valuable to set up a monitoring environment to capture effects of any failures. Such a monitoring environment should be sufficiently general so that it can be used in the future against a less well-identified threat. Another possible target for such monitoring is the conversion to the euro and its possible effects on the banking and finance infrastructure.
The above is a summary of the cross-industry and/or cross-sector activities discussed in the symposium and summarized during the final session. These activities all were aimed at improving the reliability and robustness of the information infrastructure. In the next section, the presentations, panel sessions, and subsequent discussions that led up to the final session are summarized.
Symposium Presentations and Panel Discussions
This section draws out main themes of the presentations and synthesizes results of the discussions that took place in each of the five sessions of the symposium: infrastructure evolution; infrastructure performance; policy, business, and economic issues; missing technology, practices, and people; and future collaborative activities.
Robert Kahn, president of CNRI and chairman of the XIWT Executive Committee, opened the symposium by emphasizing its goal to advance the reliability and the dependability of the national information infrastructure. Kahn highlighted the need for collaborative cross-sector activities in achieving this goal, given the highly distributed, complex nature of this infrastructure, and the common interest in its dependability and robustness. The symposium addressed this need by identifying the current state of activities and problems, identifying potential collaborative activities, and generating new ideas and effective approaches.
In his keynote address, "We're All in the Same Boat," Stephen Lukasik, former director of DARPA and CTO of the FCC and currently with Stanford CRISP, discussed some of the changes that have occurred since the initial efforts to develop the Internet at DARPA. The information infrastructure used to be organized around "natural monopolies," which itself provided a motivation for regulation. Now we see market forces as the best force, but can construct systems of unlimited complexity-thereby getting us into trouble. Shared and interdependent infrastructures require collective actions to increase their robustness systemwide and to protect them in the event of attack. We therefore are in "the same boat" as we attempt to advance the reliability and dependability of the national information infrastructure. He suggested five specific areas of possible action: (1) Organized red teaming, (2) Encouraging use of risk management for enhancing infrastructure robustness, (3) Establishment of indicators for aberrant insider or user behavior, (4) Establishment of an "indications and warning center" to enable companies to better prepare for system-wide attacks, and (5) Providing input to federal R&D planning to ensure relevance for private infrastructure operators.
Irving Wladawsky-Berger, general manager, Internet Division, IBM Corporation, gave the luncheon keynote address: "Reliable, Dependable Information Infrastructure: End-to-End." He noted how the Internet has greatly accelerated the interconnection of companies in the business environment, thereby accelerating electronic commerce as well as the application of information technology to all areas of the economy. He noted the need for reliable, secure infrastructure, or the vision will not happen as we had planned. He then discussed the government role in achieving such a secure, reliable, ubiquitous infrastructure from several perspectives, including the traditional government responsibility of assuring a reliable stable infrastructure, the national security requirement and perspective, government as a user of the information infrastructure, and in general the promise that this technology has for society. He cautioned that there are several things that government should not do, however, including legislate prematurely, set standards yet, use big bureaucracies to enforce standards, and build unique systems for government requirements. Government should, though, invest in research and development to attack the very difficult problems facing us; be a showcase user; help set standards for certain security practices; and encourage market leadership.
The presentations, panels, and discussions of the symposium are summarized by the main common topics raised and problems identified, and the needs and solution approaches that were discussed. These proceedings are organized by the five sessions.
Infrastructure Evolution
Participants reviewed the process and progress of information infrastructure evolution, identified the problems arising from the course of this evolution, and discussed the needs and approaches to solution of the problems.
The information infrastructure has evolved both structurally and in terms of usage. Irving Wladawsky-Berger's keynote, summarized above, addressed the evolution of the use of information technology and its transforming effects on every aspect of business and society at large. The dynamics of structural evolution were discussed by Howard Shimokura, of the SBC Technology Resources, Inc., in his presentation "The Changing Face of Telecommunications." Telecommunications have advanced from linear public switched telephone networks (PSTN) to a "network of networks" (NON) infrastructure. This emerging infrastructure is characterized by a fast-growing mix of incumbent and new competitive telecommunications service providers, diversity in "last mile" access networks (reutilization of copper for higher bandwidth service, cable, fixed wireless), packet switching as an alternative to circuits, and a breadth of network-hosted services and applications. Networking shifted from voice-to data-centric, with PSTN-IP gateways as new network elements. Shimokura noted that the expansion of telecommunications was driven by many factors. These included lower cost technology, lower barriers to entry, growth in use of computers and data communications, growth in wireless mobility, ubiquitous on-line access, explosion of Internet, and a promise of deregulation. He suggested that these processes enabled convergence of telecommunications with cable/broadcasting, information, and entertainment industries.
The emerging network of networks brings about challenges of achieving robustness, meeting established reliability expectations, and mitigating uncertainty associated with complex and widely distributed infrastructure.
Participants emphasized that the dynamics of the NON infrastructure raise concerns of uncertainty, diminished reliability, and inability to meet the high expectations of PSTN customers (who are used to the 99.99 percent switch reliability). Integrity of an end-to-end connection in such infrastructure depends on the integrity of the weakest link. Participants questioned whether robustness of the NON can be market driven and explored relevant research needs and joint activities. Kelly Cooper, of GTE Internetworking, spoke about the "Internet Operators Group: Industry Initiative for a Robust Internet" and highlighted the tension between cooperation for robustness and compromise of sensitive information.
Several conceptual, technical, organizational, and educational needs and collaborative approaches to infrastructure robustness were identified.
Hossein Eslambolchi, of AT&T, considered conceptual approaches to coping with complexity and the pace of information infrastructure evolution, in his presentation on "Telephony Reliability and Interoperability." Eslambolchi identified the ultimate objective as a network where failures were prevented, or detected and corrected, before they affect customer service. He considered a set of principles needed to achieve this objective, prioritizing network reliability first, followed by lowering unit costs (without sacrificing reliability) and improving capabilities through innovation. Participants noted that rapid technical change exceeded the pace of the evolution of technical standards and solutions, organizational procedures, and agreements regarding national infrastructure dependability. The need of cross-sector activi-ties was discussed and widely supported. As a concrete example of such activities, Kelly Cooper informed the participants about the Internet Operators Group work to promote, in the public interest, industry cooperation on joint technical problems involved in scaling and integrity of the Internet. Educational efforts were identified as an important prerequisite and support to cross-sector cooperation. Discussants identified the need for information infrastructure participants to inform one another and to educate the public about technical vulnerabilities and defense approaches, Internet attacks and defense incident reports, and the ongoing robustness research and experimental efforts.
Infrastructure Performance
Participants discussed realities and expectations of infrastructure performance and its measurement, identified trade-offs between performance and security, and proposed approaches to resolving performance problems.
Participants and customers of information infrastructure have high expectations of its performance, while gaps exist between desirable and actual performance characteristics.
EPRI's Steve Drenker, in his presentation on "Information Infrastructure for a Reliable Utilities Industry," characterized the robustness challenges of the nation's utilities industry. The regulated monopoly power industry of the past decades is quickly moving toward a competitive market structure. Many vertically integrated companies are being "functionally disaggregated" into separate companies for the generation, transmission, distribution, and retail sale of power and related services. Power generators produce electricity, power marketers broker energy, independent system operators or independent transmission companies will manage the transmission system, utility distribution companies distribute power to customers, and, depending on the amount of disaggregation in the various states, "meter data management agents" will provide meter reading and data management services. Electricity is now traded on a spot market, with supply and demand bids made by thousands of parties, often unknown to each other. Vigorous competition and the move toward open standardsbased protocols tend to reduce costs and encourage more suppliers to provide a greater variety of solutions and to increase the sophistication and interoperability of systems. However, technical information about open protocols is publicly available, making information assets vulnerable and creating trade-offs in vendor choices, speed, and agility versus increased risks. Drenker noted that energy companies have long attended to power security issues, but information security is just beginning to move higher on utility information technology priorities; resources lately have been largely committed to addressing Y2K and the wholesale change-out of enterprise systems to prepare the company for the challenges of competition. Sharad Singhal, of Hewlett-Packard, spoke on "Customer Views of Internet Performance" and reinforced the earlier theme of high customer expectations. Customers demand end-toend Internet service reliability and performance, while focusing on the value for money spent. Singhal mentioned that inter-provider agreements might be necessary to support end-to-end service quality. Discussants recognized the need to develop and implement performance measurements that would help determine the value of reliability to different classes of customer and achieve reliable and robust end-to-end performance.
Infrastructure performance is an area of concern because of the increasing vulnerability of information assets. Measuring performance can be problematic, but meaningful and accurate performance measurements are central to detecting problems and ensuring robustness.
Drenker called attention to the increasing vulnerability of information assets, explained by the evolution of technology (shift to open, standards-based systems and greater automation levels needed to reduce operating costs), change in business practices toward outsourcing, meeting customer demands for new energy-related services over the Internet, and the interest that competitors have in corporate information that did not exist in the monopoly industry of the past. Many participants stressed the need and proposed ideas for measuring performance in order to capture the evolving network dynamics and make meaningful and productive provisions for the future. The identified challenges included devising measurements capable of isolating faults to particular service domains, ensuring provider accountability, and standardizing performance metrics to enable service comparisons. Specific suggestions were made regarding measurement purposes and techniques. Singhal proposed metrics measuring performance (packet loss, round-trip delay), reliability (availability of service, outage length and frequency), and resource utilization. KC Claffy, of SDSC/Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis, made a presentation on "Measurement and Visualization of Internet Connectivity and Performance." Claffy identified the following premises of measurement: to monitor, depict, correlate, and predict traffic behavior on current and advanced networks, to develop and deploy tools to better engineer and operate networks, and to identify traffic anomalies in real time. Active and passive measurement techniques and cooperative ideas were discussed.
Policy, Business, and Economic Issues
Participants discussed the growing dependence of economy and society on information infrastructure, identified the scope of business vulnerabilities, and considered ways of addressing them.
Business greatly depends on the Internet for financial transactions and services. Robustness is important for effectiveness of these uses, but it is also associated with economic and security trade-offs.
Dan Schutzer, of Citicorp, commented on the extensive role of the Internet in financial services and articulated the relevant economic and security trade-offs in his presentation on "Critical Infrastructure: Policy, Business, Economic Issues-Financial Sector Perspective." Banking services on the Internet include home banking, electronic payment and authentication, corporate systems of cash and treasury management, and trading. Application characteristics range from real-time trading and daily cash management to once-a-month electronic bill payment. According to Schutzer, real-time, nonstop operation of the Internet is not crucial for operations other than trading. However, reliable, albeit not continuous, access to Internet communications is very important.
Schutzer noted that the Internet had several desirable robustness attributes by virtue of being distributed, adaptive, flexible, and diverse in media and technology. However, it also faced multiple threats, such as eavesdropping, stealing valuable information, manipulating information, denying service, and intruder-caused failure. Predicting and countering Internet emergencies is problematic, because the definitions of such emergency, its damages, and repair costs are unclear. Schutzer emphasized that business economics involved a trade-off between the necessary amount of preparedness and/or built-in robustness to cover all emergencies, and the affordable amount, which would handle most reasonable contingencies and emergencies. Schutzer noted the need to balance security with system performance requirements. This balance includes such trade-offs as customer convenience versus security, trust versus technological and contractual safeguards, and management of risk and financial crime versus privacy rights/demands of customer. Schutzer brought up several "open issues," including emergency warning and readiness, international concerns, and cross-sector resource sharing, which were further discussed by panelists and other participants. business, academia and the population at large. The panelists agreed that the growing interdependence of critical infrastructures that support society necessitates the sharing of gains and losses in both performance and security. Leiner commented that while the government assumed national security responsibility, industry was responsible for reliability and robustness of the infrastructure that it creates and operates. The general public benefited from and depended on both. The concept of cross-sector partnership was widely supported by the panel.
The complex information infrastructure involves many domestic and international actors. It is also increasingly interrelated with other domestic critical infrastructures. Challenges exist in realizing cross
Such partnership also abounds with practical challenges, however. Schutzer suggested that stringent privacy requirements precluded companies from more intimate knowledge of customer needs. Consequently, efforts to improve services in order to meet those needs were slowed. Maxwell commented on the growing world interoperability and exponential growth of players at the network level. He supported a deeper policy analysis and the need for government and the private sector to collaboratively address the challenges of this complexity. Merritt pointed out that undue emphasis had been placed on low-probability threats of terrorist attack and coordinated hostile state attack. Meanwhile, disruptions such as failure of newly deployed software prevailed. He proposed to focus on preventing and correcting the likely failures, and extrapolating lessons to counter more devastating failures. He specifically recommended test beds for experimentation with rapidly evolving middleware and beta deployment of software. Kinney expressed concerns of cascading problems within and across sectors. She identified the Department of Commerce as the leader in facilitating cross-sector efforts, because this department represented industry and focused on the overall stability and growth of national economy. Kalil identified major difficult issues in building a cross-sector partnership, such as trust, shared understanding of the exact nature of the problem, and existing mechanisms to promote cooperation. Aiken remarked that robustness depended on operating systems, and the key to improved robustness was proper risk analysis and system integration. Higginbottom addressed the importance of standards and effective government policy.
The overall discussion focused on end-to-end reliability of the infrastructure and its dependence on the weakest link. A proposal was made for the government to perform risk assessment and to share results with industry. To help test robustness, participants envisioned a methodology which would allow testing a real system under a serious attack, in order to demonstrate a vulnerability, but would stop short of bringing the system down.
Missing Technology, Practices, and People
Participants discussed the missing technical, economic, and policy elements of robustness. Particular attention was devoted to market mechanisms and consumer education.
A trustworthy system must be built from untrustworthy components. The technical challenge lies in building more effective system architectures, algorithms, and software. Anita Jones, of the University of Virginia, discussed the missing technology elements in her presentation "A Vacuum and an Opportunity." She identified a vacuum of software engineering and architecture to knit complex and disparate systems together. She explained that software had been injected into a wide diversity of industries, but without the professional infrastructure to support best practices. To fill this vacuum, she identified opportunities for university consortia in distilling the existing knowledge, researching new approaches, bringing other sectors together, and educating/training current practitioners and young generations. The Center for Survivable Infrastructures (a joint undertaking of the University of Virginia, Carnegie Mellon University, and the University of California, San Diego) exemplified this opportunity. The Center's efforts include researching architecture and simulation, information management and control, security, and systems analysis and policy. Research outputs include tools, models, software, and analysis techniques.
Steve Crocker, representing a recent National Research Council study, discussed the panel report "Trust in Cyberspace," and concluded that, at this time, trust in cyberspace was lacking. Among specific technical solutions, he proposed developing advanced system architecture or algorithms, which would include monitoring and detection for reliability and selfstabilization.
The economic and policy challenge is in the current inability of the market to generate more security. Educating customers can generate more demand. Crocker questioned the costs of obtaining trustworthiness and the role of market mechanisms. He voiced a concern that the market is not generating more robustness, because consumers seem to prefer functionality to security, or are not fully aware of security needs. Low demand for this public good underlies the need for a non-market-driven solution, or a combination of approaches.
Barbara Fraser, of the Carnegie Mellon University Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), discussed an approach to raising demand through educating customers and making technology, service providers, and community more responsible. In her presentation on "IETF GRIP: Expectations of Response Teams, ISPs, and Vendors," Fraser described the efforts of IETF GRIP to transform the work of Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) into documents that express community expectations for security. These documents are intended to educate consumers and to provide them with tools for communicating and for making informed selections when choosing a CSIRT, an Internet service provider (ISP), or a technology provider. Consumers are urged to inquire how ISPs protect their services, how technology providers handle their product vulnerabilities, and what product security features are inherent. By being aware of security needs and by demanding security features from service and technology providers, consumers can influence a market evolution toward increased robustness of information-related products. Participants welcomed the idea and considered a consumer representation model across industries. They also noted that legal and other problems are usually associated with the degree of information sharing necessary for a collective response. Aggressive research for trust in cyberspace as well as investment in risk identification and management were reemphasized.
Future Collaborative Activities
The panel identified several general and concrete future collaborative activities. This section provides a brief summary of the discussion. Specific and detailed future activities are described in the earlier section of this report, entitled "Future Cross-Industry and Cross-Sector Activities."
The challenge in future collaboration is to effectively address the scale and the continuous massive changes in infrastructure components and consumer base. The panel on "Future Collaborative Activities" was moderated by Charles Brownstein of CNRI, and included Gary Koob of DARPA, Anita Jones of the University of Virginia, Howard Shimokura of SBC Technology Resources, Inc., and Stewart Personick of Drexel University.
General proposed cross-sector approaches included collaboration in research and identification of critical first steps, providing access to real-time data and reliability to the marketplace, and raising public awareness through media, general education, support of graduate students, and consumer education.
Concrete approaches also echoed previous discussions of the symposium. Shimokura proposed using the telecommunications infrastructure robustness lessons and best practices in measurements, metrics, and network management as guidance and example in protecting the emerging network of networks. Jones proposed increased cross-sector participation in simulations and experiments, and sharing databases in order to be able to input actual private-sector data and generate realistic results. Koob proposed a survivability program which balances trust in infrastructure and in applications. Elements of this program included strategic intrusion assessment, suppression of false alarms, correlation and inference of intent, and persistent integrity marks for mobile code and network resources. Personick focused on the role of universities in creating a knowledge base of problems and possible solutions, and generating tools for utilizing this knowledge in industry and other sectors of society.
General discussion pursued these topics further and emphasized that the Year 2000 problem was a scheduled test of infrastructure robustness. Efforts must be made to use this opportunity, as well as the future conversion of the European monetary system, as a productive test of large-scale information system robustness from which valuable lessons and problemsolving techniques can be learned. A four-step conceptual structure was proposed to think about the problem: define robustness, identify what robustness elements already exist and what the gap is between the current and the desirable elements, identify ways to close the gap, and implement these solutions. 
Missing Technology, Practices, and People

